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The Priority Race: Winner Takes the
Horse
By R. DAVID LESTER* AND DAVID E. FLEENOR**
INTRODUCTION
Financial problems in recent years within the equine industry
have highlighted the inevitable conflict between the numerous
participants claiming interests in horses. Secured lenders, buyers,
bankruptcy trustees, agisters, owners of stallion breedings, veter-
inarians, insurers, trucking companies, sales companies, agents,
judgment lienholders, and others often must compete with each
other to effectively enforce a legitimate debt.
The possible combinations in which these competing claims
can and do arise are certainly complex. Moreover, the problem is
exacerbated by the incredible paucity of accepted case law relating
to (a) many of the claims presented against horses and (b) how
their respective priority ranks. Also, Article 9 of.the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.),' while otherwise an exceptionally
well-conceived and drafted legislative scheme, does not effectively
account for many subtleties in the horse industry.
Article 9 does not categorically address the problems caused
by the common use of certificates regarding horses. Horses cannot
be registered without a mating certificate, which must be provided
by the owner of the stallion. A horse must be registered to race
* R. David Lester, Partner in the firm of Stoll, Keenon & Park, Lexington, Kentucky.
B.S. 1970, Western Kentucky University; J.D. 1975, University of Kentucky.
** David E. Fleenor, Associate in the firm of Stoll, Keenon & Park, Lexington,
Kentucky. B.S. 1979, United States Naval Academy; J.D. 1987, University of Tennessee.
I Unless noted otherwise, any reference to the Uniform Commercial Code will be to
the 1972 version of the text and its accompanying official commentary. The 1972 version has
not been universally adopted and some states still retain the 1962 version. The Kentucky
codification generally adopting the 1972 version (effective July 1, 1987) will form a discussion
framework at many points in this Article. Irrespective of the particular version adopted by a
state, there are myriad local statutory variations that the prudent reader will investigate. As
will be discussed more fully, infra notes 188-208 and accompanying text, some federal statutes
such as the Bankruptcy Code and the Food Security Act of 1985 will have a preemptive effect
upon state law.
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or for its foals to race. Upon registration, a registration certificate
is issued. With many breeds other certificates may also be issued.
Article 9 also does not effectively address the difficulty of
characterizing horses as collateral. The characterization problems
stem largely from the different uses to which a horse is put during
its lifetime, the differing occupations of its owner, and its need
to be transported from state to state. A yearling on the farm may
be characterized differently from a horse of racing age being
shipped from state to state for racing meets. The same stallion
may be characterized differently depending upon the occupation
of the owner and the nature of the ownership interests, whether
individually owned or through shares of a syndication agreement.
All too often, nuances of the Bankruptcy Code2 further compli-
cate the problem.
The Article 9 problems are not unprecedented and to some
degree have been addressed by prudent equine lenders and courts
in the past, although unanswered questions still abound.' What
the down cycle of the market has introduced, however, is ex-
panded classes of creditors looking to equine collateral as the sole
means to their financial recovery. Their interests may exist under
Article 9, be created by other statutes, common law, equitable
principles or may be an animal of contract. The focus of this
Article is to address both the recent developments in the field of
equine liens and to try to reconcile the conflicting priorities raised
by the various types of interests. Particularly in a down market,
this priority game often goes from being a theoretical discussion
to "winner take all."
I. SPECIAL CONCEPTS AFFECTING EQUINE SECURITY INTERESTS
There are certain concepts that must be explored before ef-
fectively analyzing the participants in the priority race, the basis
of their claims, and the priority scheme. These concepts arise out
of special laws of limited applicability or the vagaries of horse
industry practice and trade custom. These concepts are in many
ways both counter-intuitive and foreign to the normal analysis of
competing liens.
2 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
3 Many of these problems were addressed in Lester, Secured Interests in Thoroughbred
and Standard Horses: A Transactional Approach, 70 Ky. L.J. 1065 (1981-82). Where the law
has not significantly changed, this Article will summarize the previous article rather than
restating the law in depth.
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A. The Food Security Act of 1985
The Food Security Act of 1985 (F.S.A.)4 enacted a provision
protecting the rights of purchasers of farm products subject to
security interests and liens. This section ("Farm Products Sec-
tion") is codified at 7 U.S.C. section 1631 (1988) and became
effective on December 23, 1986. 5 To understand the genesis of
this provision, one must first understand the inconsistent state
codifications of U.C.C. section 9-307 and the varying degrees of
protection it afforded the purchasers of farm products. 6
Under the 1972 Official Draft of U.C.C. section 9-307:
(1) a buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of
Section 1-201) other than a person buying farm products from
a person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security
interest created by his seller even though the security interest is
perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence. 7
Thus purchasers of a horse or other farm product could not avail
themselves of the normal protection available to buyers in the
ordinary course of business. This version of section 9-307 was
originally adopted in forty-nine states. 8 As of the enactment of
the F.S.A., 9 twenty states10 had opted out of this farm products
exception in whole or in part. The Kentucky codification follows
this trend.
Kentucky makes exceptions for tobacco sold through a Ii-
censed warehouse," livestock sold at public auction through a
licensed stockyard, 12 and horses whose racing is regulated by
Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 230 (K.R.S.). 3 In each in-
stance, the bona fide purchaser for value takes free of any lien.' 4
4 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988) [hereinafter F.S.A.].
I Id. at subsection (j).
6 For purposes of this discussion it will be assumed that a horse constitutes a farm
product. See discussion of characterization infra notes 87-128 and accompanying text. Horses
are expressly within the definition of farm products contained in the F.S.A. 7 U.S.C. §
1631(c)(5).
7 UNIoFR CoMmacRAL CODE § 9-307(1) (1972) [emphasis added] [hereinafter U.C.C.].
I H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 108, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1103, 1212.
9 7 U.S.C. § 1631.
10 See supra note 8, at 1213.
11 Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-307(2) (Baldwin 1989) [hereinafter K.R.S.].
,2 Id. at § 355.9-307(4).
,3 Id. at § 355.9-307(6). K.R.S. ch. 230 regulates racing of thoroughbreds, standardbreds,
quarter horses, appaloosas, and Arabian horses.
14 K.R.S. § 355.9-307(1).
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Additionally, the warehouse stockyard or auctioneer is also not
liable to the holder of a lien unless he or she had been given
written notice of the lien by registered mail prior to the sale.' 5
Without the protection afforded by statutory variations such as
those enacted in Kentucky, the purchaser of a farm product could
end up paying for the product twice-once to the seller and once
to the creditor or lienholder.
The state responses to a perceived problem caused by U.C.C.
section 9-307 in turn caused additional problems. First, the "ex-
ceptions to the exception" enacted by states such as Kentucky
were not all encompassing. A review of Kentucky's provision
reveals no change in the treatment of a purchaser of a farm
commodity other than tobacco or the purchaser of livestock from
other than a licensed stockyard or the purchaser of a horse not
subject to the racing regulations of K.R.S. Chapter 230.16 Further,
the variations of other states follow no set pattern. By way of
example, Georgia protects a commission merchant selling agri-
cultural products17 but not the ultimate purchaser. 8 Utah grants
blanket protection to the purchaser of farm products in the or-
dinary course of business unless the creditor or other lienholder
complies with special rules promulgated by the Division of Cor-
porations and Commercial Code. 19
The purpose behind the original version of U.C.C. section 9-
307 was to grant the creditors of farmers greater protection. By
1985, the financial crisis in American farming had resulted in a
shift in priorities and a general attitude that the risk of credit
supervision should reside with the lenders instead of innocent
buyers of farm products.20 In many instances, these buyers have
little or no way to verify the existence of a lien.2'
The fact that twenty states opted out of this onerous provision
merely exacerbated the problem, as the Code was no longer
uniform. 22 Congress viewed this in and of itself as a burden on
,1 Id. at (4).
16 Id.
17 GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-307(3) (1982).
, Id. at (1).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A.-9-307(4) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
0 See supra note 8.
21 While this discussion centers on the effects of the statutory provisions on equine liens,
farm products include fungible commodities often sold subject to twenty-four hour payment
rules. Trade in these goods is not conducive to leisurely searches of various county U.C.C.-I
files.
. See supra note 8.
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interstate commerce. 23 The central provision of the F.S.A. dealing
with farm products essentially negates the exception language of
U.C.C. section 9-307:
Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section and not-
withstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,
a buyer who in the ordinary course of business buys a farm
product from a seller engaged in farming operations shall take
free of a security interest created by the seller, even though the
security interest is perfected; and the buyer knows of the exis-
tence of such interest. 24
The F.S.A. does provide protection to a vigilant creditor
under the provisions of subsection (e).2 Buyers will continue to
take farm products subject to existing liens only if creditors
provide them with written notice of the security interest and
certain other matters and the buyers have failed to perform their
payment obligations or if the farm product is sold in a state that
has established an approved centralized filing system. 26 Unfortu-
' Id.
2 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d).
Id. at (e).
7 U.S.C.A. § 1631(e) states:
A buyer of farm products takes subject to a security interest created by
the seller if -
(1)(A) within 1 year before the sale of the farm products, the buyer has
received from the secured party or the seller written notice of the security interest
organized according to farm products that -
(i) is an original or reproduced copy thereof;
(ii) contains,
(1) the name and address of the secured party;
(II) the name and address of the person indebted to the secured
party;
(III) the social security number of the debtor or, in the case of a
debtor doing business other than as an individual, the Internal Revenue
Service taxpayer identification number of such debtor;
(IV) a description of the farm products subject to the security interest
created by the debtor, including the amount of such products where
applicable, crop year, county or parish, and a reasonable description of
the property; and
(iii) must be amended in writing, within 3 months, similarly signed and
transmitted, to reflect material changes;
(iv) will lapse on either the expiration period of the statement or the
transmission of a notice signed by the secured party that the statement has
lapsed, whichever occurs first; and
(v) any payment obligations imposed on the buyer by the secured party
as conditions for waiver or release of the security interest; and
(B) the buyer has failed to perform the payment obligations, or
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
nately for creditors situated in states, like Kentucky, that do not
have centralized filing systems, it is not always possible to discover
the identity of the purchaser or even the existence of a sale until
it is too late.
The policy and effect of the Farm Products Section of the
F.S.A. is illustrated by United States v. Progressive Farmers
Marketing Agency.27 In that case, the creditor of several hog
farmers brought an action for conversion against a marketing
agency that had sold some of the farmer's hogs.28 The farmers
had executed a series of promissory notes with the Farmers Home
Administration (F.H.A.) and had granted a security interest in
their farm products. 29 The F.H.A. had in turn properly filed
financing statements with the Recorder of Deeds in the proper
county and with the Iowa secretary of state. 0 The farmers then
sold their hogs through the marketing agency, which had no actual
notice of the security agreement. 31 The agency remitted the pur-
chase price, minus commission, to the farmers.3 2 The F.H.A. then
brought suit seeking an accounting of the value of the hogs. 33
The district court, relying on Iowa's version of U.C.C. section
9-307, held that the sale did not extinguish the F.H.A.'s security
interest. 34 The agency had argued that once it gained possession
(2) in the case of a farm product produced in a State that has established
a central filing system -
(A) the buyer has failed to register with the Secretary of State of such
State prior to the purchase of farm products; and
(B) the secured party has filed an effective financing statement or notice
that covers the farm products being sold; or
(3) in the case of a farm product produced in a State that has established
a central filing system, the buyer -
(A) receives from the Secretary of State of such State written notice as
provided in subparagraph (c)(2)(E) or (c)(2)(F) that specifies both the seller
and the farm product being sold by such seller as being subject to an effective
financing statement or notice; and
(B) does not secure a waiver or release of the security interest specified
in such effective financing statement or notice from the secured party by
performing any payment obligation or otherwise....
As Kentucky does not have a centralized filing system for farm product liens, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1631(e)(2) does not apply.
788 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1328.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
3 Id.
'4 Id. at 1328-29.
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of the hogs, they ceased to be farm products and became inven-
tory not subject to the U.C.C. section 9-307 exception. 35 The
district court rejected this argument as it would allow farmers to
avoid liens merely by using agents to sell their farm products
instead of selling directly. 36
The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that
the lien was indeed extinguished by a sale through a commission
merchant. 37 The appellate court relied upon a recent amendment
to Iowa's version of U.C.C. section 9-307, conceptually similar
to Kentucky's, that excepted out of the farm products exception
buyers without actual written notice of the existence of a security
interest.3 8 Their amendment was not effective at the time of the
alleged acts; however, the court used its contemporaneous enact-
ment as evidence of public policy. 39 The court also noted that the
enactment of the Food Security Act likewise was evidence of a
public policy-contrary to the plain language of the existing stat-
ute. 40
The logic of the court in Progressive Farmers does not with-
stand detailed scrutiny. It ignores both the plain language of
U.C.C. section 9-307 and assumes that the Iowa legislature and
Congress merely reaffirmed the existing state of the law instead
of correcting a perceived problem. The case does highlight the
general dissatisfaction with the effect of U.C.C. section 9-307's
"farm products" exception and the inequities that it could create.
The enactment of the F.S.A. injects a degree of certainty into the
1, See id. at 1329.
36 Id.
" Id. at 1331.
" Id. at 1330. IowA CODE ANN. § 554.9307(4)(a) (West 1985), in effect at the time the
court rendered its decision, read:
(4)(a) A buyer in the ordinary course of business buying farm products from a
person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest created by
that person's seller even though the security interest is perfected, unless the
buyer receives prior written notice of the security interest, or unless the buyer
purchases the farm products outside of the seller's trade area, or the buyer's
principal place of business is located outside of the seller's trade area. The
"seller's trade area" consists of the county in which the seller resides or a county
that is contiguous to or comers upon the county where the seller resides.
19 Progressive Farmers, 788 F.2d at 1330.
41 Id. at 1331. The court noted that the state and federal provisions were both enacted
after the sale at issue and neither contained a provision applying it retroactively. Id. at 1330-
31. The court also noted a statutory presumption in favor of prospective application of
statutes. Id. at 1330 n.3 (citing IowA CODE Am. § 4.5 (1985)). However, the court went on
to hold that the amendment to U.C.C. § 9-307 was merely related to the procedure by which
substantive law is enforced.
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field by putting the creditor on notice both of the risks in relying
upon farm products as collateral and the necessity to act aggres-
sively to ensure the continued validity of its lien. A creditor so
forewarned is in a stronger position than was the F.H.A., which
erroneously relied upon the plain language of a statute.
A trap for the unwary arises from the broad nature of the
F.S.A.'s provisions. As noted, many states such as Kentucky had
provided some relief from the provisions of U.C.C. section 9-307
in the form of statutory revisions. Unlike many of these, the
provisions of the F.S.A. are not limited to specific situations such
as a licensed stockyard. The Act addresses any situation where
the buyer in the ordinary course of business purchases farm
products from a seller engaged in farming operations. 41
B. U.C.C. Section 9-310
U.C.C. section 9-310 provides substantial guidance in analyz-
ing the priority between perfected security interests and certain
other liens. This provision states:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person
given by statute or rule of law for such materials or services
takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is
statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise. 42
The official commentary to the U.C.C. states that this reflects a
policy that liens "arising from work intended to enhance or
preserve the value of the collateral take priority over an earlier
security interest even though perfected. ' 43 While this provision
may inject a degree of uncertainty as to the future relative priority
of a lien, on the whole, it promotes an equitable result.
The entity providing the services has an incentive to either
preserve or enhance the collateral, while the prior lienholders
generally benefit from having the collateral's value enhanced.
Additionally, the priority gained only remains as long as posses-
sion is maintained, 4 although possession may not be necessary
7 U.S.C. § 1631(d).
4' U.C.C. § 9-310.
41 Id. at comment 1.
" Id. at comment 2. That a tradesman-type lien is subordinate to a perfected security
interest lien when possession is relinquished is implicit in U.C.C. § 9-310. See Blazer Mach.
Co. v. Klineline Sand & Gravel Co., 533 P.2d 321, 324 (Or. 1975). See generally, A. AINmaasoN,
UNUoRM COMNMCIAL CODE § 9-310:9 (3d ed. 1985).
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for the creation, perfection, or validity (as opposed to priority)
of the particular statutory or common law lien. Finally, the pro-
vision does not enhance the lien's priority if the statute expressly
provides otherwise. 45
For purposes of this discussion, the types of liens affected by
this priority enhancing provision are primarily those created in
favor of agisters, veterinarians, trucking companies, and other
entities that would take actual possession of a horse. Analysis
under both the new and pre-1984 version of K.R.S. section 376.400
shows the application of U.C.C. section 9-310. Under the old
version of K.R.S. section 376.400, the statute expressly limited
the lien in the manner of a landlord's lien for rent. Under K.R.S.
section 383.070, a landlord's lien on property of the tenant on
the leased premises is superior to any lien "created while the
property is on the leased premises, whether the rent accrued
before or after the creation of the other liens" to the extent of
four months rent. 46
Applying this statutory restriction to an old version agister's
lien created the following results. A lien perfected before the
agister ever came into possession of the horse at issue remained
superior to the agister's lien. 47 The priority bump of U.C.C.
section 9-310 did not kick in because the statute "expressly pro-
vide[d] otherwise.' '48 Once the agister gained possession, however,
any lien credited for unpaid services was bumped up in priority
above liens created after possession was gained even if that lien
had been perfected prior to the time that the agister provided the
services for which he was not paid.49 The increased priority was
only to the extent of four months services .
4' U.C.C. § 9-310.
K.R.S. § 383.070(3).
41 Lee v. VanMeter, 32 S.W. 137, 138 (Ky. 1895).
4' U.C.C. § 9-310. The priority of the pre-1984 agister lien was addressed in Vanmeter,
a pre-U.C.C. case. The court held the lien subordinate to an interest perfected prior to the
agister taking possession of the livestock at issue. Id. at 138. The same result was reached in
Washington County Bank v. Red Socks Stables, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 782 (Neb. 1985), a case
applying U.C.C. § 9-310. Under the Nebraska agister statute at the time, agister's liens were
superior to prior liens "as long as the holder of any prior liens shall have agreed in writing
to the contract for the feed and care of the livestock involved .. ." Id. at 784 (citing NEB.
RV. STAT. § 54-201 (Reissue 1984)). Since the bank had not consented to the contract, the
bump up provision of U.C.C. § 9-310 did not apply. Id. at 784-85. In both scenarios, under
the present version of K.R.S. § 376.400 and U.C.C. § 9-310 taken together, the agister would
have prevailed.
' K.R.S. § 383.070(3) (1979).
50 Id.
1989-901
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Finally, the agister had to be vigilant with respect to posses-
sion. While the old agister lien statute provided a mechanism for
enforcement 5 1 after the horse had left the premises, the priority
bump of U.C.C. section 9-310 was lost as the possession require-
ment was no longer met. The lien itself continued for ten days.12
Under the present version of K.R.S. section 376.400, there is
no tie in to landlord liens.5 3 Thus, while in possession, an agister
has a lien superior to security interest liens perfected before the
agister came into possession of the horse. This lien will remain
in effect for up to one year after possession is relinquished.5 4 Of
course, the priority bump of U.C.C. section 9-310 is lost when
possession is relinquished.
An interesting theoretical problem arises in this area with
respect to common law and equitable liens. In many instances,
statutory liens reflect a codification of existing common law con-
cepts. U.C.C. section 9-310 affects the priority of these liens as
well. Being non-statutory, the common law liens are therefore not
subject to any statutory limitations. Neither is the old version of
Kentucky's agister lien statute or Nebraska's present agister lien
statute which was discussed earlier.5 5 In the event that lienholders
wish to avail themselves of the priority enhancing features of
U.C.C. section 9-310 but the applicable statutory lien has limiting
language, thought should be given to characterizing the lien in
terms of its common law or equity origins.56 While the counter
to this characterization is that the applicable statute preempted
the field, this would at least arguably keep U.C.C. section 9-310
in play.
51 K.R.S. § 376.410 (1981). The agister's lien shall continue and be enforceable for up
to ten days after possession is relinquished. The current version of the statute allows enforce-
ment up to one year after removal.
52 Id.
53 K.R.S. § 376.400.
5 Id.
1' See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
As an example, a lien is expressly created by K.R.S. § 376.420 for the service fee of
a stallion. This type of lien was recognized at common law as well. Sawyer v. Gerrish, 70
Me. 254, 255 (1879); Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 485, 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). In the case of
this particular statute, there is no express impediment to the application of U.C.C. § 9-310.
If the statute did contain express limitations, however, at least arguably the common law lien
could be invoked. An equitable lien that is judicially imposed is a limited form of the
constructive trust, giving a party a security interest in property to prevent unjust enrichment.
See D. DoBas, HANDBOOK ON am LAw OF REaMEDIs 248-250 (1973). As it is a creature of
equity, the existence of a statutory remedy militates against its application in the situation
described, but its assertion should at a minimum increase the level of discomfort felt by the
prior lienholder confronting the harsh realities of U.C.C. § 9-310.
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C. Waiver of Interest
The practices and customs of the horse industry, coupled with
certain provisions of the U.C.C., make waiver of rights a real
possibility for unsophisticated or imprudent creditors.5 7 One such
waiver provision, already discussed, is contained in U.C.C. sec-
tion 9-307(1) dealing with buyers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. Another trap for the unwary is contained in U.C.C. section
9-306(2), which states:
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other
disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the
secured party in the Security Agreement or otherwise, and also
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections re-
ceived by the debtor.58
The "or otherwise" language raises the spectre that merely allow-
ing participation in an event such as a claiming race or horse sale
constitutes a waiver of the security interest.
In Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, Inc. 59 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals invoked U.C.C. section 9-306(2) to
vitiate a security agreement's requirement of the express consent
of the secured party prior to disposition of the collateral-in that
case an airplane.60 The debtor had been permitted to sell aircraft
as a dealer and to collect the full purchase price.6 1 When the
dealer collected the purchase price, he did not in that instance
remit to Cessna the amount of the mortgage.6 2 Cessna then at-
tempted to assert its lien against the new owner.6 3 Using U.C.C.
section 9-306(2), the court held that the security interest of Cessna
had been extinguished.64
In affirming this result, 65 the Kentucky Supreme Court chose
to rely upon the buyer in the ordinary course of business provi-
sions of U.C.C. section 9-307(1). 66 While this may be the sounder
For an in-depth discussion of the waiver issue, see Smith, Implied and Conditional
Consent in the Sale of Horse Shares or Seasons, 74 Ky. L.J. 839 (1985-86).
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (emphasis added).
"23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1015 (Ky. App. 1978).
0 Id. at 1018-19.
" Id. at 1018.
"Id. at 1016.
6Id.
"Id. at 1018.
,1 Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Skyway Enter., Inc., 580 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1979).
" Id. at 494-95.
1989-90]
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basis for the result, Cessna Finance and U.C.C. section 9-306(2)
nonetheless create serious implications for a secured party by
allowing the debtor to conduct sales of horses on a regular basis,
particularly where neither section 9-307 nor the Food Security
Act can be made to apply.
Indeed, the rationale of the court of appeals in Cessna Finance
was followed in a case involving equine liens. Trimble v. North
Ridge Farmse7 dealt with a nomination right in the stallion Af-
firmed. The debtor had purchased a fractional share in the Af-
firmed syndication, paying a portion in cash, and executing a
promissory note for the balance 8 The seller took a security
interest in the share that was properly perfected. 69 The syndication
agreement contained a provision whereby breeding rights could
be sold. 70 The debtor sold her 1982 nomination to North Ridge
Farms.1 Subsequently, the debtor defaulted on the promissory
note, causing the seller to repossess her share.7 2 The share was
then resold.73 Both the new owners of the share and North Ridge
Farm claimed the 1982 breeding right.7 4
While the circuit court held for the new share owners, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held for North Ridge, a decision
affirmed by the supreme court.7 The crux of the supreme court
decision was that an authorized sale extinguished the security
interest under U.C.C. section 9-306(2).76 The clear impact of both
North Ridge and Cessna I is that a secured creditor must be
vigilant in protecting its rights to the extent that its actions do
not constitute a waiver.
D. Claiming Races
If the horse that is the subject of a security interest is of
racing age, the claiming race presents a novel problem not to be
overlooked by the lienholder. Essentially, a claiming race is a
device to equalize competition and provide opportunities for horses
700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985).
" Id. at 397.
6 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
7. Id.
7 Id. at 397-98.
76 Id. at 397.
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of lesser quality. The conditions for a particular claiming race,
drawn up by the racing secretary at each track, will specify a
particular price or prices for horses in the race. 77 Entering a horse
in that race constitutes an irrevocable offer to sell the horse at
that price. 78 Normally, this offer can be accepted only by licensed
owners in good standing at that race meet or by the holder of a
certificate of eligibility to claim.79 A claim of the horse may be
made at any time up to fifteen minutes prior to the post time of
the race. 0 If there is more than one claim of the same horse, the
stewards determine by lot the new owner of the horse."'
The premise behind the claiming race is that it ensures horses
of equal value will compete against each other. For example, the
owner of a fifty thousand dollar horse would not enter it in a
ten thousand dollar claiming race for it would almost certainly
be claimed. Even though the purse is distributed to the original
owner, this would still be an economically poor decision. Like-
wise, the owner of a fifteen hundred dollar horse would not enter
it in a twenty-five thousand dollar claiming race as there is little
likelihood of the horse either being claimed for that price or of
winning against better quality horses. The premise has for the
most part proved correct, and a substantial number of American
thoroughbred and harness races are claiming races.
For the lienholder, allowing the debtor to enter a horse in a
claiming race raises the spectre of a waiver of the lienholder's
position.8 2 As an initial proposition, the owner/debtor must hold
either the Jockey Club or the United States Trotting Association
eligibility certificate in order to enter the horse in a race. s U.C.C.
1See, e.g., Daily Racing Form, July 3, 1989, at 13. The first race at Arlington Park
on that date was a $10,000 claiming race; however, for each $500 decrease in claiming price,
a horse would be allowed to race at two pounds under the set weight of 122 pounds. If the
owner were willing to enter the horse at a $9,000 claiming price, the horse would race at 118
pounds.
71 810 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:015 §§ 1, 11 (1989) [hereinafter K.A.R.]. The regulations in
810 K.A.R. ch. 1 cover thoroughbred racing. Similar regulations for harness racing are
contained in 811 K.A.R. Chapter 1; for quarter horse, appaloosa, and Arabian racing, 811
K.A.R. ch. 2. As the provisions are similar, reference will be made to the thoroughbred
regulations for simplicity.
79 810 K.A.R. 1:015 § 1.
Id. at § 8.
" Id. at § 10.
2 A more complete discussion on waiver is contained in the text supra accompanying
notes 57-76.
" See, e.g., 810 K.A.R. 1:012 § 1 (requiring horse to be registered with the Jockey
Club).
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section 9-306(2) allows the sale of collateral free of a security
interest if the sale is authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise.8 4 The mere fact that the creditor allowed
the debtor to retain the registration certificate and to enter the
collateral in a claiming race may constitute authorization to sell
the collateral free of the security interest.
In addition, the racing regulations may expressly provide for
this situation with respect to liens. The Kentucky thoroughbred
racing regulations state:
Any person holding a lien of any kind against a horse entered
in a claiming race must record the same with the racing secretary
and/or horseman's bookkeeper at least thirty (30) minutes be-
fore post time for that race. If none is so recorded, it shall be
assumed that none exists."
At first glance, this regulation may seem draconian from the
perspective of the creditor as it effectively creates another filing
requirement for an already perfected security interest. The regu-
lation, however, provides a degree of clarity. Also, a lender taking
a security interest in a horse of racing age should possess a degree
of sophistication with respect to racing practices.
E. Characterization of Property Interests
Any analysis of the relative priority of conflicting liens in
horses will at some point turn upon the category of collateral to
which the horse belongs. This category will determine, among
other things, the proper state and office in which financing state-
ments should be filed, the proper method to perfect a security
interest, the proper choice of law, and, in extreme instances,
whether the U.C.C. is even applicable.
Unfortunately, characterization is a complex issue not capable
of easy resolution. 6 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that
U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
810 K.A.R. 1:015 § 15.
Currently before the Kentucky legislature during the 1990 session is Senate Bill 300
which would amend certain provisions of the U.C.C. Specifically K.R.S. 355.9-109 would be
amended to make it clear that equine interests are farm products irrespective of whether the
debtor is engaged in farming. K.R.S. 355.9-401 would likewise be amendment to make it clear
that the proper place for the filing of a security interest in equine is the county of the debtor's
residence if within Kentucky and in the office of the Secretary of State if the debtor is a
nonresident of Kentucky. These amendments, if adopted, will greatly simplify the characteri-
zation problem.
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the same horse will be characterized differently-depending upon
its use and the business or occupation of the owner. Finally,
concepts such as stallion syndication shares, registration certifi-
cates, mating certificates, and pooling of shares cause further
confusion.
The characterization analysis of an equine controversy typi-
cally begins with an attempt to divide horses into one of four
categories of goods under U.C.C. section 9-109. This is premature
because an initial determination needs to be made as to whether
the particular property interest constitutes goods at all. If the
horse itself is the property interest, the characterization as goods
is clearly appropriate.8 7 The more difficult question arises when
the interest is a breeding season, stallion share, or right to pro-
ceeds from a pooling agreement. These conceivably could be
characterized as an account"8 or general intangibles. 9 Registration
papers may be treated as documents or arguably instruments. 90
In Kwik-Lok Corp. v. Pulse,91 the court considered whether
the sale of breeding rights was the sale of goods governed by
Article 2 of the U.C.C.92 The parties in that action had jointly
owned two thoroughbred stallions. 93 In transferring full ownership
of the stallions to Kwik-Lok, Pulse was granted two free breedings
a year in each stallion. 94 The breeding rights were not retained as
part of the bills of sale but were granted contemporaneously by
letter.95 Thereafter, Kwik-Loc sold the stallions and informed
Pulse that his breeding rights were terminated. 96 Kwik-Loc then
brought an action seeking to determine the enforceability of the
letter.97 The lower court held for Pulse,98 a decision affirmed in
part and reversed in part by the court of appeals. 99 On appeal,
Kwik-Loc argued that the sale of breeding rights was a sale of
See Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (holding Article 2 of
the U.C.C. to apply to the sale of a horse).
- See U.C.C. § 9-106.
89 See id.
9 See id. at (j).
11 702 P.2d 1226 (Wash. App. 1985).
9Id. at 1228.
91 Id. at 1227.
94 Id.
" Id.
9 Id. at 1228.
7 Id.
" Id.
9Id. at 1231, 1232.
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goods subject to Article 2 of the U.C.C. 00 The court held this
not to be a sale of goods, and thus not subject to Article 2's gap
filling provisions. 101
Kwik-Loc turned on the fact that sperm inside a stallion was
not readily separable, and hence was not movable. 02 The court
noted that, had artificial insemination been employed, a different
result might have been reached. 03 The case did not consider
arguments that the utility of the stallion is completely tied to the
value of its breeding rights and that the grant of the breeding
rights constituted an interest in the stallion.
Once the determination is made of whether the interest con-
stitutes goods, U.C.C. section 9-109 divides the concept of goods
into four subcategories: consumer goods,' °" equipment, 05 farm
products,'1 and inventory. 0 7 The commentary to the U.C.C. views
these four subcategories as mutually exclusive with the determi-
nation of the proper subcategory hinged primarily upon the use
of collateral. 08 The commentary also expressly recognizes that the
same goods may be characterized differently in the hands of a
different owner. 0 9
The definition of farm products"0 sets up a myriad of possible
results as the horse progresses from a foal on the farm to a horse
of racing age to a mare or stallion back on the farm. The owner
may be actively engaged in farming operations, an investor with
no other connection to farming, an owner engaged in the business
of racing, etc. Racing itself could be construed as an adjunct to
farming under some scenarios. The characterization problem may
in fact become more a process of elimination and in any event
must be acutely attuned to the vagaries of a particular jurisdic-
tion.
The case law is instructive if only in the sense that it highlights
the difficulty of the characterization problem. As an initial mat-
"' Id. at 1228. Kwik-Loc's application of the U.C.C. was intended to shorten the contract
length to less than the breeding life of the stallions. How application of the U.C.C. would
achieve this is less than clear.
101 Id.
' Id.
,01 Id. at n.1.
-- U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
105 Id. at (2).
106 Id. at (3).
"17 Id. at (4).
"I Id. at comment 2.
109 Id.
110 Id. at (3).
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ter, one can probably eliminate the category of consumer goods,
The types of horses for which conflicting security interests become
a problem are normally not intended "primarily for personal,
family or household purposes." ''
In re Bob Schwermer & Associates, Inc. 1 2 illustrates the proper
approach to characterization. In that case, the debtor had granted
a security interest in six thoroughbred horses to a bank in ex-
change for a commitment to refrain from collecting a pre-existing
debt." 3 Critical to whether the bank had properly perfected its
interest was a determination of whether the horses were "farm
products" or "equipment"-categories subject to different filing
requirements." 4 The debtor had purchased the horses for the
business of racing and further was not engaged in farming or
breeding of horses. 1 5 The court concluded that the horses consti-
tuted equipment and that the bank had properly perfected its
interest by filing a financing statement with the Illinois Secretary
of State."16
The problem presented to the court by In re Bob Schwermer
is straightforward and the conclusion clearly correct. Yet it takes
no great imagination to see that the issue will rarely be so clear-
cut. What if the debtor had been engaged in farming and breed-
ing? What if the horses were not yet of racing age and still being
kept on the farm? What if the horses had been purchased not for
racing but for resale? The court was not required to answer any
of these questions, but the prudent lender may well be required
to do so.
A quarter horse stallion has been held not to be a farm
product or equipment used in farming." 7 The debtor in the In re
Butcher case, a banker and businessman," 8 executed a security
agreement granting a purchase money security interest in Sonny
Dee Bar, a quarter horse stallion, to Landers, who filed a fi-
nancing statement with the Texas Secretary of State.' 9 The horse
was used exclusively for breeding purposes after the sale, 20 al-
Id. at (1).
27 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1983).
' Id. at 306.
I, d. at 308.
" Id.
116 Id.
,17 In re Butcher, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 345 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
", Id. at 349.
' Id. at 347.
' Id. at 349.
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though the original intent of the seller was to form an investment
syndication 21 The debtor was later the subject of an involuntary
bankruptcy petition. 22 The trustee asserted the horse, as a farm
product, was subject to local filing and thus the trustee's interest
was superior to the unperfected interest of Landers. 2 1
In analyzing whether the stallion constituted either a farm
product or equipment used in farming, the court used a definition
of farming operations somewhat narrower than the common usage
of either term. 24 Thus, the mere fact that equipment is useable
on a farm, or in fact is actually, physically employed on a farm,
was not viewed as being determinative. 25
With respect to the debtor, according to the court, the mere
fact that he undertook an activity ancillary to farming did not
make him a person engaged in farming operations. 26 Thus, ac-
cording to the court, the stallion was neither a farm product nor
equipment used in farming operations. 27 Landers' interest was
deemed properly perfected. 28
This is a troublesome case because breeding operations would
clearly seem to constitute farming operations. The court seems to
have been heavily influenced by the primary occupation of the
debtor. Would it not have been better to view the debtor as being
employed in more than one occupation? Nothing in the U.C.C.
indicates "primary" occupation is dispositive.
F. Registration Certificates
Various private associations control the registration of horses
in the United States, with each association normally concerned
with a specific breed of horse. Particularly germane to this dis-
cussion are the Jockey Club, the United States Trotting Associa-
tion (U.S.T.A.), the American Quarter Horse Association
(A.Q.H.A.), and the Arabian Horse Registry of America. These
associations regulate the registration of thoroughbreds, stan-
dardbreds, quarter horses, and Arabians, respectively. 29 Each
"2 Id. at 347.
12 Id.
'2 Id. at 349.
124 See id. at 351-52.
'2 Id. at 352.
1' Id.
m Id. at 354.
' Id. at 355.
'2 See, e.g., Mattheis v. Jockey Club, 387 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Ky. 1975); Adams v.
American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 583 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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association has its own standards and rules.'30 Courts have rou-
tinely recognized the right of these private associations to regulate
the industry and their members, subject only to limited judicial
review.' 3' An analysis of the activities of these associations is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, the registration cer-
tificate that an association may provide for a particular horse is
a critical component in any security interest analysis. For this
discussion, the certificates of the Jockey Club and the U.S.T.A.
will be examined.
These certificates serve one or more primary purposes. First,
they may serve as an indicia of title. Second, the certificate serves
as the authenticating document for a horse to race or to be used
for breeding purposes. For thoroughbreds in Kentucky, the ad-
ministrative regulations state that:
Registration Required. No horse may be entered or raced in this
state unless duly registered and named in the registry office of
the Jockey Club in New York and unless the registration certif-
icate or racing permit issued by the Jockey Club for such horse
is on file with the racing secretary; except, however, the stewards
may for good cause, in their discretion, waive this requirement
if the horse is otherwise correctly identified to the stewards'
satisfactions. Jockey Club registration certificate of each horse
must be filed with the horse identifier within forty-eight (48)
hours after the horse's arrival on the grounds.' 32
Similar regulations govern standardbred racing. 133
The importance of the certificate highlights some inherent
problems, particularly with respect to a horse of racing age. The
most prudent policy for a creditor to follow would be to retain
possession of the certificate. However, racing regulations clearly
prevent this, with respect to thoroughbred horses engaged in
racing,' 34 raising the possibility of a waiver by a secured party.
As previously discussed, the possession of the certificate may
assist the owner in transferring a horse, particularly in the instance
of a claiming race, with or without the lienholder's consent.' 3S
130 See Mattheis, 387 F. Supp. at 1126; Adams, 583 S.W.2d at 824.
' See Mattheis, 387 F. Supp. at 1127-28; Adams, 583 S.W.2d at 824.
332 810 K.A.R. 1:012 § 1.
,' See 811 K.A.R. 1:030(1), (2).
,'4 810 K.A.R. 1:012 § 1. For standardbreds this problem may be alleviated to some
degree by the use of an eligibility certificate, a document separate and distinct from the
registration certificate. 811 K.A.R. 1:030.
II$ See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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One court has even gone so far as to treat the certificate itself
as property separate and distinct from the horse. In Lee v. Cox,136
a seller retained the registration certificates to eight Arabian horses
as security for the balance of the purchase price.17 No other
action was taken by the seller to perfect his security interest. 3 '
The bankruptcy court determined that the seller had no security
interest in the horses, a conclusion the appellant did not contest. 39
The district court, however, reversed the bankruptcy court's de-
termination that the papers should be turned over to the debtor
in possession to facilitate sale of the horses. 40 The court held
that either under common law or under U.C.C. precepts the seller
had perfected a security interest in the certificates themselves
relying primarily upon a contracted right to retain them. 141
This Solomon-like decision resulted in the seller retaining the
certificates, which had no actual value, and the debtor having a
right to sell the horses at the best price obtainable without the
certificates. 42 While this case may reach an equitable result, it
does not either have a meaningful conceptual basis nor does it
take into account the real nature of the registration certificates.
Lee has recently been both rejected' 4 and cited favorably; 44 how-
ever, it would certainly be at least academically unfortunate if
Lee were to find its own niche in the law of equine security
interests.
The holding of Lee was criticized in In re Blankenship-Cooper,
Inc.,' 4 a case that reflects a sound and conceptually proper anal-
ysis of the issue. In that case, two separate security agreements
with the debtor, both purporting to perfect liens in the American
quarter horse stallion Shawnee Bug, had been executed. 46 The
first granted a purchase money security interest in the horse to
-6 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 807 (M.D. Tenn. 1976).
" Id. at 807-08.
' Id. at 809.
I' d. at 808-09.
,40 Id. at 811.
' Id. at 810-11.
,"2 Id. at 811.
,,1 In re Blankenship-Cooper, Inc., 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1008, 1012 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1984).
I" In re Wildlife Center, Inc., 102 Bankr. 321, 325-26 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1989) (holding
that deletion was not entitled to turnover of horse certificates in which other parties possibly
had interest).
14 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1008, 1012 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 1984).
,,6 Id. at 1010.
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A.R. Levis, who had sold the horse to the debtor.' 41 Six months
later, the debtor executed a second security agreement with
InterFirst Bank Dallas granting a security interest in the horse
and all general intangibles.148 Additionally, InterFirst was in pos-
session of the horse's registration papers. 49 InterFirst contended
that possession of the certificate and a security interest in general
intangibles gave it a superior lien on Shawnee Bug's breeding
rights.150
With respect to the registration certificate, the court disa-
greed.' 5 ' The certificate could be replaced by the AQ.H.A. upon
a showing of superior title. 152 With respect to the second argu-
ment, that the breeding rights were a general intangible not cov-
ered by a security interest in the horse, 53 the court held that the
breeding rights were not severed from the horse absent an express
agreement, such as a syndication agreement, to do so.'14 Addi-
tionally, Levis' "interest 'in and to all of the debtor's interest
and property rights' in SHAWNEE BUG" was sufficiently broad
to include unsevered breeding rights."-' The interest of Levis was
held to be superior.1 6
147 Id.
14 Id.
"9 Id.
"' Id. at 1010-11.
1 Id. at 1012-13. The court stated:
The holding of the District Court in Lee would appear to give InterFirst a
perfected security interest in the A.Q.H.A. certificate in its possession. However,
upon closer analysis of the present facts, this conclusion is questionable on
several grounds. Like the registration certificates issued in Lee, American Quarter
Horse Association registration certificates clearly do not possess the qualities
which would allow them to be fitted into one of the categories of § 9.305....
To characterize a registration certificate as an instrument would be a conceptual
anomaly. See generally R. Lester, Security Interests in Thoroughbred and Stan-
dard Bred Horses: A Transaction Approach, 70 Ky. LJ 1065 (1981-82). Under
Rule 25 of the Official Handbook of the American Quarter Horse Association
(32d ed 1984). "Ownership of an issued registration certificate remains with the
Association; . . .". Since the registration certificate does not possess attributes
of negotiability (a requirement under the Code definition of instrument, see §
9.105(a)(9)); and can be owned only by the Association, it is not the complete
embodiment of the underlying right and therefore not an instrument which can
be perfected by possession under § 9.305.
(Footnotes omitted).
In Id. at 1013. See, e.g., Principal Rules and Requirements of the American Stud Book,
Rule 7(c); U.S.T.A. Rule 26 (1987).
"I See In re Blankenship-Cooper, Inc., 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1008, 1014 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1984).
Id. at 1016-17.
,' Id. at 1017 (emphasis in original).
15 Id.
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In sum, registration certificates present a problem not capable
of easy resolution. They are not absolute documents in the sense
of a motor vehicle title. Mere possession of the certificate will
not perfect a security interest. Further retention of the certificate
will not be practical in the case of a horse actively engaged in
racing because the certificate may be necessary in order for the
horse to compete. Proper use of the certificate by a creditor can
enhance its position if for no other reason than the leverage it
may afford.
G. Mating Certificates
A mating certificate is required in order to register a foal with
any of the various registration bodies.157 It is provided by the
stallion owner and constitutes the certificate of authenticity as to
the foal's bloodlines. By contract, the stallion owner will often
retain the mating certificate pending payment of the stallion fee.
This raises the same types of questions with respect to property
interests as retention of registration papers.158 The foal has de
minimis value without the mating certificate.
A recent bankruptcy court decision addressed the problem of
dealing with retention of both mating certificates and registration
certificates. 5 9 In In re Wildlife Center, Inc., the debtor sued to
compel other parties to turn over the documents in question.'60
Relying on Lee, the court treated both the mating certificate and
the registration certificates at issue as property, separate and
distinct from the horses to which the documents related. 16' As the
documents were not in the possession of the debtor at the time
of filing, under 11 U.S.C. section 541 they did not constitute
property of the estate. The court refused to issue an order com-
pelling them to be turned over. 62
Both Lee v. Cox and In re Wildlife Center reach arguably
equitable results, but they do so on analytically shaky grounds.
The documents do not conceptually represent property, as they
See Principal Rules and Requirements of the American Stud Book, Rule 2; U.S.T.A.
Rule 26.
" See supra notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
"' In re Wildlife Center, 102 Bankr. at 322.
110 Id. at 321-22. Surprisingly, the context of the case was a motion for default judgment
that the debtor lost despite the fact that neither the stallion owner nor the auction company
responded to the motion.
161 Id. at 325.
Id. at 327.
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are merely indicia of the status of registration with a private
association. In fact, the associations themselves may own the
certificates. 63 The analysis should be whether this in fact is a
transaction "intended to create a security interest . . ." under
U.C.C. section 9-102(a) or whether it should be viewed as an
executory contract, with a condition precedent to turning over
the certificate being receipt of payment. If it is the former, the
rules of the U.C.C. in perfecting a security interest in the horse
should apply. If it is the latter, those rules are inapplicable.
H. Stallion Shares
The property interest that constitutes the collateral may not
be the horse itself, but a syndicate share in a stallion. This share
is a creature of the syndicate agreement and may not constitute
goods as that term is used in U.C.C. section 9-109; instead, it
may be an account or some form of general intangible or both. 164
The particular syndicate agreement is the key to this analysis.
Most syndicate agreements purport to convey an undivided inter-
est in the horse itself to each syndicate member, thus lending
itself to a characterization as goods. 165
That was the position taken by the tax court in In re Harry
F. Guggenheim, 66 a 1958 case dealing with the syndicate of the
thoroughbred stallion *Turn-To.l 67 The position of the Internal
Revenue Service was that the sale of the shares was the sale of
breeding rights and that the gain constituted ordinary income. 68
The position of the taxpayer, adopted by the tax court, was that
this was the sale of a capital asset. 69 While not a U.C.C. Article
9 case, the analysis of the tax court is appropriate here as well.
When the breedings are sold, we must consider whether the
breedings are proceeds from the share, goods, or a separate
intangible. What if the breedings are sold for several years in the
future? In North Ridge Farms Inc. v. Trimble, 70 the Kentucky
M See, e.g., Rule 25 of the Official Handbook of the American Quarter Horse Associ-
ation.
. U.C.C. § 9-106.
' U.C.C. § 9-109.
-- 46 T.C. 559 (1966).
16 An asterisk appearing in front of a horse's name indicates a foreign bred horse.
- In re Harry F. Guggenheim, 46 T.C. 559, 560.
16 Id. at 568.
110 30 Ky. L. Summ. 15 at p. 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 700 S.W.2d
396 (Ky. 1985).
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Court of Appeals held that the sale of one year's breeding rights
to a stallion was the sale of a general intangible although ac-
knowledging that the value of a syndicate share lies in its appur-
tenant breeding rights. 7'
Related to the issue of characterization of stallion shares is
the concept of pooling arrangements. The syndication agreement
for thoroughbred stallions will normally provide for each share-
holder to breed a mare to the stallion each season. With respect
to standardbreds and other breeds of horses where artificial in-
semination is allowed, it is common for multiple breedings to be
allocated to shareholders. With respect to all breeds, though, it
is not unusual to have some sort of pooling of excess or unused
breedings. Under this arrangement, breedings are sold by the
syndicate manager and the proceeds distributed in some pro rata
fashion as determined by the contract. From a security interest
analysis, the pool proceeds may be characterized as proceeds from
the sale of goods or as an intangible.
II. THE PARTICIPANTS AND THIR CLAIMs
As previously stated, the nature of the claims against horses
can vary greatly. Claimants may have assumed their positions
voluntarily as in the case of a lender or seller financing the
purchase of a horse by someone else. Creditors may come into
their positions reluctantly such as in the instance of a judgment
creditor attempting to execute upon an adversary's equilfe interest.
The debt may have been created by providing goods or services.
The various interests will be analyzed seriatim.
Because the existence and priority of liens are distinct con-
cepts, a two step analysis is necessary. First, is there a lien? If
so, is it prior or subordinate to a competing lien? Liens and
claims may come into existence in several different manners,
including the following: (1) consensual (i.e., security interests);
(2) statutory; (3) common law; (4) equitable; (5) execution; (6)
bankruptcy; and (7) purchase. Each of these liens and claims is
considered in some detail in the following discussion.
Once a lien comes into existence, the lienholder will have a
claim against the property that will have priority over others with
debts not secured by the property. 72 The situation becomes more
"I Id. at 3.
172 See Brunner v. Home for the Aged, 429 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1968); 51 AM. Jox. 2D:
Liens § 1 (1970) (tax lien superior to all future estates, including remainders).
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complex, however, when there are several liens against a particular
horse. That is, how are the proceeds allocated among the com-
peting lienholders?
When the competing liens are consensual security interests,
U.C.C. section 9-312 provides us with a relatively well-defined
set of rules.173 If the competition is between a "lien creditor" and
7 U.C.C. § 9-312 states:
(1) The rules of priority stated in other sections of this Part and in the
following sections shall govern when applicable: Section 4-208 with respect to
the security interests of collecting banks in items being collected, accompanying
documents and proceeds; Section 9-103 on security interests related to other
jurisdictions; Section 9-114 on consignments.
(2) A perfected security interest in crops for new value given to enable the
debtor to produce the crops during the production season and given not more
than three months before the crops become growing crops by planting or
otherwise takes priority over an earlier perfected security interest to the extent
that such earlier interest secures obligations due more than six months before
the crops become growing crops by planting or otherwise, even though the
person giving new value had knowledge of the earlier security interest.
(3) A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority
in identifiable cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory
to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the
debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to
the holder of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a
financing statement covering the same types of inventory (i) before the date
of the filing made by the purchase money secured party, or (ii) before the
beginning of the 21 day period where the purchase money security interest
is temporarily perfected without filing or possession (subsection (5) of Section
9-304); and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification
within five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects
to acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor,
describing such inventory by item or type.
(4) A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory
has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its
proceeds if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the
debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter.
(5) In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including
cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special
priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined according
to the following rules:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of
filing or perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering
the collateral or the time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is
earlier, provided that there is no period thereafter where there is neither
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the holder of an unperfected security interest, U.C.C. section 9-
301 governs priority. 174 When one of the liens is a perfected
security interest and the other is "given by statute or rule of
law," section 9-310 governs priority. 75 When the lien is based on
the Bankruptcy Act, statutory guidance is also provided in the
statute itself. 176
filing nor perfection.
(b) So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first to
attach has priority.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) a date of filing or perfection as to
collateral is also a date of filing or perfection as to proceeds.
(7) If future advances are made while a security interest is perfected by
filing, the taking of possession, or under Section 8-321 on securities, the security
interest has the same priority for the purposes of subsection (5) with respect to
the future advances as it does with respect to the first advance. If a commitment
is made before or while the security interest is so perfected, the security interest
has the same priority with respect to advances made pursuant thereto. In other
cases a perfected security interest has priority from the date the advance is made.
174 U.C.C. § 9-301 states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security
interest is subordinate to the rights of
(a) persons entitled to priority under Section 9-312;
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is
perfected;
(c) in the case of goods, instruments, documents, and chattel paper, a
person who is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other
buyer not in ordinary course of business or is a buyer of farm products in
ordinary course of business, to the extent that he gives value and receives
delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected;
(d) in the case of accounts and general intangibles, a person who is not
a secured party and who is a transferee to the extent that he gives value
without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.
(2) If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security
interest before or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the
collateral, he takes priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien
creditor which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time
of filing.
(3) A "lien creditor" means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the
property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for
benefit of creditors from the time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy
from the date of the filing of the petition or a receiver in equity from the time
of appointment.
(4) A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is
perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the extent that it secures
advances made before he becomes a lien creditor or within 45 days thereafter
or made without knowledge of the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered
into without knowledge of the lien.
'7 See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
176 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988).
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Similarly, many of the statutory liens contain guidelines for
priority. 177 In the case of purchases, there are a number of dif-
fering sources that provide guidance including sections 9-301(1)(c)
and 9-307 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 part 4 of Article
'" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. Am. §§ 85.011-85.051 (West 1987) (veterinary lien statute that
establishes relative priorities).
7 K.R.S. § 355.9-307, the Kentucky codification of U.C.C. § 9-307, states:
(1) A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of KRS 355.1-
201) other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming
operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
(2) If any tobacco crop subject to the lien of a security interest is sold at
public auction through a duly licensed tobacco warehouse in the ordinary course
of business, a bona fide purchaser for value of such crop shall take title thereto
free and clear of any such lien, and the warehouseman selling such tobacco crop
shall not be liable to the holder of such lien, unless written notice by certified
mail, return receipt requested, of such lien, the name and address of the debtor
and proper description of the property subject to lien, are given to the tobacco
warehouseman prior to the payment of the proceeds of sale to the owner or
producer of such tobacco crop.
(3) If any grain or soybean crop subject to the lien of a security interest is
sold to any entity which is a bona fide purchaser for value and which holds a
current grain storage license issued by the Commonwealth of Kentucky or a
current federal warehouse storage license, in the ordinary course of business,
such entity shall take title to such crop free and clear of any such lien, and shall
not be liable to the holder of such lien, unless written notice by certified mail,
return receipt requested, of such lien, the name and address of the debtor and
proper description of the property subject to the lien is given to the entity
purchasing said crop prior to the payment of the proceeds of purchase to the
owner or producer of such grain or soybean crop.
(4) If any livestock subject to the lien of a security interest is sold at public
auction through a stockyard licensed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky in the
ordinary course of business, a bona fide purchaser for value of such livestock
shall take title thereto free and clear of any such lien, and the stockyard and
selling agents selling such livestock shall not be liable to the holder of such lien,
unless written notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, of such lien, the
name and address of the debtor and proper description of the livestock subject
to lien is given to the stockyard prior to the time of sale.
(5) In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of a security interest
even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest, for
value and for his own personal, family or household purposes unless prior to
the purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering such
goods.
(6) If any registered breed of horse, the racing of which is regulated by
KRS Chapter 230, subject to the lien of a security interest is sold at public
auction in the ordinary course of business by an organization engaged in the
business of selling such horses at public auction, a bona fide purchaser for value
of such horse shall take title thereto free and clear of any such lien, and the
organization selling such horse shall not be liable to the holder of such lien,
unless written notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, of such lien and
the amount thereof, the name and address of the debtor and proper identification
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2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 179 and the Food Security Act
of the horse subject to lien are given to the organization prior to the time of
sale.
(7) A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection
(1) of this section) takes free of a security interest to the extent that it secures
future advances made after the secured party acquires knowledge of the purchase,
or more than forty-five (45) days after the purchase, whichever first occurs,
unless made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the
purchase and before the expiration of the forty-five (45) day period.
'7' U.C.C. § 2-401 states:
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and
remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies
irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title.
Insofar as situations are not covered by the other provisions of this Article and
matters concerning title become material the following rules apply:
(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their
identification to the contract (Section 2-501), and unless otherwise explicitly
agreed the buyer acquires by their identification a special property as limited
by this Act. Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property)
in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation
of a security interest. Subject to these provisions and to the provision of the
Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9), title to goods passes from the
seller to the buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on
by the parties.
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference
to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security
interest and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different
time or place; and in particular and despite any reservation of security interest
by the bill of lading
(a) if the contract requires or authorized the seller to send the goods
to the buyer but does not require him to deliver them at destination, title
passes to the buyer at the time and place of shipment; but
(b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on
tender there.
(3) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where delivery is to be made
without moving the goodsi
(a) if the seller is to deliver a document of title, title passes at the
time when and the place where he delivers such documents; or
(b) if the goods are at the time of contracting already identified and
no documents are to be delivered, title passes at the time and place of
contracting.
(4) A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or retain the
goods, whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of acceptance revests
title to the goods in the seller. Such revesting occurs by operation of law
and is not a "sale".
U.C.C. § 2-402 states:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), rights of unsecured
creditors of the seller with respect to goods which have been identified to a
contract for sale are subject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods under
this Article (Sections 2-502 and 2-716).
(2) A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods
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of 1985.180
As with many aspects of the horse industry, the priority analysis
often is made outside of recognized rules. For example, if a stallion
owner refuses to provide a mating certificate needed for a sale the
following week, the issue may be determined more by the impor-
tance of entering the horse in the sale than whether the other
lienholder is entitled to priority.18'
With respect to non-Article 9 liens, the one rule of priority
appears to be that a prior lien will be superior to a subsequent
to a contract for sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the
seller is fraudulent under any rule of law of the state where the goods are
situated, except that retention of possession in good faith and current course of
trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale or
identification is not fraudulent.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of creditors
of the seller
(a) under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article
9); or
(b) where identification to the contract or delivery is made not in current
course of trade but in satisfaction of or as security for a pre-existing claim
for money, security or the like and is made under circumstances which under
any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated would apart from
this Article constitute the transaction a fraudulent transfer or voidable pref-
erence.
U.C.C. § 2-403 states:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had
power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights
only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has
power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods
have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such
power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored,
or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous
under the criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention
of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the
delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the
entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to-be
larcenous under the criminal law.
(4) The right of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed
by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6)
and Documents of Title (Article 7).
7 U.S.C. § 1631. See supra notes 4-40 and accompanying text,
" See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
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lien. 182 Two caveats must be noted, however. First, notice of a
prior lien will be necessary in order to render it superior to another
lien. 83 Further, a court of equity has the authority to reprioritize
conflicting liens. 184 Thus a lien that has had the effect of preserving
or enhancing the value of the common collateral is normally enti-
tled to first priority. 185
Of course, one way to establish priority is by agreement. U.C.C.
section 9-316 provides a key provision which states that "[n]othing
in this Article prevents subordination by agreement by any person
entitled to priority." Thus, when an impasse is reached, U.C.C.
section 9-316 provides one means for resolution. An example would
be a lien, such as an agister's lien, that is possession dependent.'8 6
The owner may request that the agister turn the horse over to a
consignor for sale, but this would negate the priority bump of
U.C.C. section 9-310. Compliance with the provisions of K.R.S.
section 376.410 in having a warrant issued would arguably enhance
the agister's position, although it is not clear that this would act
as a constructive possession and thus retain the priority bump.
Obtaining a subordination agreement may work to preserve the
agister's position.
A. Buyers
By the contract for sale, a buyer at a minimum acquires all
title in the horse that his seller had the power to transfer. 87 If the
horse is free and clear of any other lien, claim, or security interest,
that title is absolute. Normally this title passes with delivery of the
112 51 AM. JuR. 2D: Liens § 51 (1970).
"' Id.
I" Id. One unreported circuit court opinion has addressed the relative priorities of
conflicting liens. Buster v. Hale, No. 88-CI-067, slip op. (Scott Circuit Court, May 20, 1988).
In that case an agister sought to enforce his lien upon certain horses which were also subject
to perfected security interests and stallion keepers' liens. The court first held that the agister's
lien was superior to the perfected security interest by operation of K.R.S. 355.9-310 for those
horses remaining in the agister's possession. Further the court held that the retention of the
mating certificate was "possession" of goods sufficient to give the stallion keeper priority
over the perfected security interest. The court then applied the equitable doctrine of marshalling
assets, that is that each of the horses must be sold to satisfy the agister's lien upon that horse.
The stallion keeper's lien should be next satisfied as the perfected security interest. This case
seems to buttress itself more in the court's equitable powers than in the U.C.C. and in that
sense may be the correct approach.
10 Id. This is the underlying rationale of U.C.C. § 9-310.
'1 See infra notes 209-25 and accompanying text.
I- U.C.C. § 2-403.
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goods.' The interest of the buyer is conceptually different because
it is an ownership interest and not a lien. Thus, if the buyer's
interest is adjudged to have priority, the buyer gets the horse free
and clear.
A lien interest with priority on the other hand gets priority
only to the extent of the lien. As an example, purchaser A buys a
horse for ten thousand dollars. The horse is subject to B's ten
thousand dollar lien. By the time the priority question is resolved,
the horse has increased in value to twenty thousand dollars. If B's
lien interest is found to have priority, he is entitled only to his ten
thousand dollars. If A's interest is found to have priority, however,
he is entitled to the entire twenty thousand dollars and not just his
purchase interest. His interest is title to the property, not a lien
upon it.
The rights of the buyer of a horse with respect to other security
interests and claims against that horse are dependent on the status
of both the buyer and the seller. The first line of protection to a
buyer is the F.S.A.8 9
If that act is not applicable, the buyer will next examine the
provision of U.C.C. section 9-307(1) that gives protection to a
buyer in the ordinary course of business. 190 This provision contains
language making it inapplicable to purchasers of farm products
from a person engaged in the business of farming; however, if that
exception applies, the buyer will likely have been able to rely upon
the F.S.A.
A buyer in the ordinary course of business is defined as "a
person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to
him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a
third party in the goods buys in the ordinary course from a person
in the business of selling goods of that kind. .. ."191 If these
requirements are met, the buyer will take free of any security
interest even those of which he has actual or constructive notice.
The key question as to the applicability of this exception will
be whether the seller is "a person in the business of selling goods
" U.C.C. § 2-401(2).
" 7 U.S.C. § 1631.
, U.C.C. § 9-307 is discussed more fully at supra notes 4-40 and accompanying text in
the context of the farm products exception contained in U.C.C. § 9-307(1) and the F.S.A.
Whether a horse constitutes farm products and whether the seller is a person engaged in
farming operations are two of the central problems in characterization of an equine asset.
191 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
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of that kind .... 1 9 2 The drafters of the U.C.C. did not intend
that this provision only apply to merchant sellers although it is
clear that it does not apply to a one-time or casual seller.' 93 A sale
that is merely incidental to the seller's primary business will not
qualify.'9 4 Applying these basic precepts to the horse industry re-
sults in a continuum with a large gray area. A major consignor in
the business of selling yearlings would clearly qualify.'9 5 One-time
owners selling their stock may not qualify.
In addition to the Food Security Act, state statutory variations
may make this more of a theoretical problem. Under K.R.S. section
355.9-307(4), any bona fide purchaser of a race horse sold at public
auction takes free and clear of any prior liens. The organization
conducting the sale also avoids any liability. This variation is not
uniform with other states and any reliance upon it is dependent
upon a high degree of comfort that Kentucky law will apply. Also
the exception requires that the buyer qualify as a bona fide pur-
chaser, i.e., one who takes in good faith, for value, and without
knowledge of the other parties' rights. 196 Thus, in some respects
this provision is narrower than U.C.C. section 9-307(1), which
applies irrespective of the buyer's knowledge that the property is
encumbered, Prior to the F.S.A. of 1985, the large number of
important public auctions conducted in Kentucky made this an
important provision.
Possession is important to buyers as their title interest normally
arises at the time they come into possession unless the contract for
sale states otherwise.' 97 Furthermore, some types of liens are en-
forceable only if the lienholder is in possession.
B. Secured Parties
The rights of a secured party are governed by Article 9 of the
U.C.C. The security interest will attach when the collateral is (a)
192 Id.
M93 See Al Maroone Ford, Inc. v. Manheim Auto Auction, Inc. 208 A.2d 290 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1965) (Seller of automobile was not "in business of selling goods of that kind" when he
purchased the auto from a new car dealer and sold it to an auto auctioneer.).
'91 See, e.g., O'Neill v. Barnett Bank, 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. App. 1978) (purchaser of
airplane was aware that seller's primary business was renting aircraft, not selling aircraft);
John Deere v. Jeff De Witt Auction Co., 690 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. App. 1985) (farmer who sold
tractors occasionally was not a tractor dealer).
'15 Again, this assumes neither the farm products exception nor the F.S.A. is applicable.
K.R.S. § 355.9-307(4).
" As an example of title passing without possession, title passes at the fall of the
hammer at a public auction. See, e.g., Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton, 703 S.W.2d 885, 887-88 (Ky.
App. 1986).
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either in the possession of the secured party or the debtor has
signed a security agreement; (b) value has been given; and (c) the
debtor has rights in the collateral. 19 This is the type of transaction
that is the primary focus of Article 9.199
The problems facing secured parties with an interest in equine
collateral are the proper method to perfect their interest (by filing
a financing statement, possession, or otherwise), maintaining pro-
tection of their interest in an inherently mobile good, and achieving
a priority over the interests of other participants in the priority
race. The interest of the perfected secured party will prevail against
other liens that do not qualify for priority under U.C.C. section
9-310 or that had not attached prior to perfection of the security
interest. The secured party will prevail against a subsequent pur-
chaser unless U.C.C. sections 9-307, 9-306(2) or the Food Security
Act applies.
C. Bankruptcy Trustees
Bankruptcy trustees (or debtor in possession in a Chapter 11
or 12 reorganization) are in charge of the administration of the
bankruptcy estate and as such are empowered to avoid certain
preferential transactions. They also have the status of a judicial
lien creditor at the time of bankruptcy filing2°° with respect to the
bankruptcy estate. Thus the interest of the trustee will prevail
against unperfected security interest liens. 20 1
Obviously, a complete discussion of the bankruptcy code and
the powers of the trustee are beyond the scope of this Article. A
case example will suffice to demonstrate that the trustee potentially
has the power to upset the ordered priority of interests and liens
attaching to equine collateral.
In re Bob Schwermer & Associates2 2 dealt with the situation
where a bank had taken a security interest in six race horses as
collateral for a preexisting debt. The value given by the bank was
a commitment to forbear collection of the preexisting debt.20 3 The
t U.C.C. § 9-203.
'9, This type of lien is discussed in depth in Lester, supra note 3.
- 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
2 U.C.C. § 9-301(b).
36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1400 (N.D. 111. 1983). This case is dealt with in greater detail
supra in the text accompanying notes 112-16, in the context of the problem of characterizing
equine collateral under U.C.C. § 9-109.
Id. at 1407.
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court found that the bank had a valid and perfected security
interest in the horses. 204 The analysis did not conclude there, as it
might in the non-bankruptcy context. The court then had to deter-
mine whether the transaction occurred in the ninety day voidable
preference period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition 2 5
or whether the transaction met one of the fraudulent transfer
provisions for transactions occurring in the year before the filing
date. 206
The court ultimately held that the transfer took place outside
the ninety day period but within one year preceding filing. A full
hearing had to be held2 7 to determine whether the transaction met
the requirements as a voidable preference. If that could have been
proved, the bank's otherwise prior and perfected security interest
would have been subject to the trustee's avoiding powers. 20 8 Thus,
whether the interest of the trustee will prevail is dependent upon
both the timing of the conflicting interest and whether the trans-
action upon which it is based is subject to avoidance.
D. Agister
An agister is a "person engaged in the business of pasturing
of cattle as a bailee in consideration of an agreed price to be paid
by owner of cattle. ' 20 9 Thus, an agistment is, a specialized form of
bailment relating to the care of cattle and horses. 210 The rights of
an agister are inherently contractual and there was no common
law lien arising from the nonpayment of the contractual fee.211
This group of potential creditors includes stableman and liverymen,
operators of boarding farms and, to a limited extent, racetracks,
sales companies, and veterinarians.
Agisters are the subject of statutory liens in many jurisdictions,
including Kentucky. The Kentucky statute shows the evolving na-
w4 Id.
- 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
-' 11 U.S.C. § 548.
2 In re Bob Schwermer & Assoc., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1400, 1408 (N.D. IM1. 1983).
-' 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)-(B) would have allowed the transaction to be avoided if the
debtor had been insolvent at the time or there had not been equivalent value in the exchange.
20 BLACKs LAW DIcTONARY 61 (5th ed. 1979).
210 The plain meaning of cattle would seem to be limited to bovine livestock. However,
it is not uncommon for the statutory definition to include equine animals as well. See, e.g.,
K.R.S. § 446.010(6).
211 See, e.g., Hanch v. Ripley, 26 N.E. 70 (Ind. 1890). See generally 4 Am. Jus. 2D:
Animals § 74 (1962).
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ture of this type of lien as its amendment in 1984 transformed it,
in some respects, from a possessory to nonpossessory lien. Cur-
rently, the Kentucky statute states:
Any owner or keeper of a livery stable, and a person feeding or
grazing cattle for compensation, shall have a lien for one (1) year
upon the cattle placed in the stable or put out to be fed or grazed
by the owner, for his reasonable charges for keeping, caring for,
feeding and grazing the cattle. The lien shall attach whether the
cattle are merely temporarily lodged, fed, grazed and cared for,
or are placed at the stable or other place or pasture for regular
board.
21 2
Coinciding with the amendment to the lien statute itself is a
corresponding new enforcement mechanism:
Any person in whose favor a lien provided for in KRS 376.400
exists may, before the district court of the county where the cattle
were fed or grazed, by himself or agent, make affidavit of the
amount due him and in arrears for keeping and caring for the
cattle, and describing as nearly as possible the cattle kept by him.
The court shall then issue a warrant, directed to the sheriff or
any constable or town marshall of the county, authorizing him
to levy upon and seize the cattle for the amount due with interest
and costs. If the cattle are removed with the consent and from
the custody of the livery stable keeper or the person feeding or
grazing them, the lien shall not continue longer than one (1) year
from and after the removal, nor shall the lien in case of such
removal be valid against a bona fide purchaser without notice at
any time after the removal. The warrant may be issued to a
county other than that in which the cattle were fed or grazed,
and the lien may also be enforced by action as in the case of
other liens.213
2W2 K.R.S. § 376.400 (effective July 13, 1984). Compare to the previous enactment, which
read:
Any owner or keeper of a livery stable, and a person feeding or grazing cattle
for compensation shall have a lien upon the cattle placed in the stable or put
out to be grazed by the owner, for his reasonable charges for keeping, caring
for, feeding and grazing the cattle. The lien shall attach whether the cattle are
merely temporarily lodged, fed, grazed and cared for, or are placed at the stable
or other place or pasture for regular board. The lien shall be subject to the
same limitations and restrictions placed upon a landlord's lien for rent.
The limitations referred to were contained in K.R.S. § 383.070 dealing with landlords liens.
Among these restrictions and agister's line was limited to the amount due for the previous
four months and was expressly subject to any liens arising after the horse came onto the
premises but before the agister's lien actually attached. K.R.S. § 383.070(3).
213 K.R.S. § 376.410. Significantly, the lien continues for a period of one year after
possession is lost instead of ten days.
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These amended sections greatly enhance the protection afforded
an agister. Heretofore, the lien had been completely dependent
upon possession of the animal at issue and would expire ten days
after possession was relinquished. Even more important, however,
is the fact that the statute is no longer tied to the limitations and
restrictions contained in the Landlord Rent Lien statute. 214 Prior
to this amendment, there had been an expressed limitation upon
both the priority and extent of the lien that to some extent modified
the effect of U.C.C. section 9-310.215 The old agister's lien would
only encompass four months boarding fee and would not be su-
perior to a lien perfected prior to the time the agister took posses-
sion.
While the district court proceeding authorized by K.R.S. section
376.410 may be helpful where the agister is not in possession, the
district court proceeding apparently is not a necessary requisite to
the lien itself. Thus, the lien afforded by K.R.S. section 376.400
should be enforceable by judicial foreclosure without a district
court proceeding under K.R.S. section 376.410.216
An agister in possession of the horse would have priority over
all Article 9 liens by operation of U.C.C. Section 9-310.217 The
agister in possession may prevail against the interest of a buyer as
his or her possession should act as constructive notice of the lien,
thus defeating bona fide purchaser status. 218 Absent some priority
enhancing statute, even an agister in possession will be subordinate
to a valid common law or statutory lien that attached prior to the
time the agister's lien attached and to which the agister had notice,
subject to the court's inherent equitable power.219
An old Kentucky case, Griffith v. Speaks 02° gave a stableman
some leverage with respect to enforcing charges due from an owner
for the boarding of more than one horse. In that case, the owner
had brought ten horses.to the stable at the same time. Five of the
horses were removed prior to the stableman seeking to enforce his
lien. The court noted that the stableman had no lien on the horses
214 K.R.S. § 383.070.
"I5 This statute is discussed more fully, supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
216 "The lien may be enforced by distress warrant or by action as in cases of other
liens." Speth v. Brangman, 84 S.W. 1149 (Ky. 1905).
217 See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
21 The interest of the agister will be subject to the operation of the F.S.A. in the proper
circumstances.
219 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
- 63 S.W. 465 (Ky. 1901).
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that had been removed, but went on to hold that the entire board
bill could constitute a lien on the remaining horses.22' The court
held that
if several head of horses were placed in the stable of appellees
by appellants at the same time under a contract to pay for their
keep, a lien could be asserted against a part of the horses which
still remain in their possession for the keep of others which may
have been removed more than 10 days before sending out the
warrant.m
There are three plausible interpretations of the holding of this
case. First, it may be viewed as a pre-U.C.C. case with no contin-
uing validity. Second, it may be narrowly construed as applying to
the situation where an owner contracts with an agister to care for
a unit of more than one horse. This could be likened to a me-
chanic's lien that attaches to the entire automobile, not just the
part on which work is performed. Finally, a broad construction
could be given so that the agister's lien is continuous in nature and
attaches to any property of the debtor in the agister's possession.
Of the three, the first would seem the most reasonable. The
premise of section 9-3 10 in giving priority to a statutory lienholder
in possession is that value has been added to the collateral. 23 The
secured party generally should not be placed at an unfair disad-
vantage. A secured party might only have a lien upon one horse
and it would be unfair to charge board on numerous horses sold
separately. Repairing the part to a car adds value to the whole car,
but caring for one horse adds no value to other horses.
The broad reading of Griffith is, of course, the least fair since
it would subordinate a secured party's interest to debts in no
meaningful way related to his or her specific collateral. In fact,
the holding of Griffith does not purport to speak to this situation.
A final note on the subject of agister's liens is provided by the
old case of Black v. Brennan.-4 In that case an innkeeper was held
to have a lien upon a stolen horse brought to the inn by the thief.
At first glance this case seems to run directly contrary to the
hornbook maxim that a thief can convey no title."5 Further, since
2' Id. at 467.
mId.
Purpose 1 in the official commentary to U.C.C. § 9-310.
35 Ky. 310 (1837).
21, Blue Grass Taxi Garage Co. v. Shepherd, 200 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1947) (automobile
theif could not convey title).
1989-90]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
an agistment is a form of bailment and is contractual in nature, it
takes some leap of faith to imply a contract between the true owner
and the innkeeper. Irrespective of whether the holding would be
followed today, a strong policy argument can be made that the
decision was correct. The actions of an agister in general have the
effect of preserving the value of the collateral. Any resulting loss
in priority or equity on the part of other creditors of the owner
arguably would have been lost had the actions not been taken.
E. Stallion Owners
In contrast to an agister or stablekeeper, the owner of a stallion
had a common law lien for the service fee as long as the stallion
owner retained possession of the mare.226 This common law lien
has in many jurisdictions been replaced by a statutory codification.
In Kentucky the codification states:
(1) Any licensed keeper of a stallion, jack or bull shall have a
lien for the payment of the service fee upon the get of the stallion,
jack or bull, for one year after the birth of the progeny.
(2) This lien may be enforced by action as in cases of other liens,
or by warrant as permitted in the case of enforcement of the lien
of the keeper of a livery stable or an agister.227
The object of the lien is different from its common law ante-
cedent as the "get" referred to is the progeny and not the mare.2
This is important because it implies into the statute the guarantee
of a live foal. Without that, there is nothing to which the lien can
attach. The stallion service contract will control this from a con-
tractual standpoint. Some contracts will provide a guarantee of a
live foal or allow for the return of the mare in the event of no
offspring. This is not universal and some particularly successful
stallions whose services are in high demand will stand with no
21 See Sawyer v. Gerrish, 70 Me. 259 (1879); Grinnel v. Cook, 3 Hill 485 (N.Y. 1842).
- K.R.S. § 376.420. The fact that the statute refers to a "licensed keeper" reflects the
fact that contemporaneous with this statute was a requirement that stallion owners maintain
a license. This requirement has since been repealed although it could be the subject of a
muncipal or county ordinance. One Kentucky case, Smith v. Robertson, 50 S.W. 852 (Ky.
1899), held that there was no lien absent a license. As the law disfavors implicit repeal of a
statute, Fiscal Court v. City of Anchorage, 393 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1965), it is likely that a
court today would ignore the "licensed keeper" language in an action involving this statute.
In It is not clear whether the statute preempts the common law lien.
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guarantee. In the event of no live foal, the stallion owner is left
only with a contractual claim.? 9
The other alternative available to the stallion owner is retention
of the mating certificate as security for the unpaid stallion service
fee2 0 Normally, the breeding contract will provide for this type
of leverage on the part of the stallion owner. The document itself
is of no value, but without it the foal may not be registered.
Additionally, the agister statute may be available with respect to
the charges for boarding the mare, although this expense may be
de minimis in comparison to the stallion fee.
F. Veterinarians
A significant expense in the care and upkeep of a horse is
veterinary fees and services. Advances in equine medicine have
increased both the quality and expense of such services. Horses
that in the recent past would have been humanely destroyed as a
result of debilitating racetrack injuries can now be restored to
productivity. The nature of the veterinarian's financial interest is
contractual. If the veterinary fees are not paid, the veterinarian
has as an option of bringing a civil action for breach of contract.
The viability of this option depends on the availability of a solvent
defendant at the end of an increasingly long path of litigation. The
nonpayment of the fees would at a minimum make that availability
somewhat suspect. The other alternative is to look to the horse
itself, particularly if the veterinarian has taken and retained pos-
session of the horse.
As in the case of agisters, veterinary services are generally not
the subject of a common law lien.? 1 Unfortunately, Kentucky does
not provide a statutory lien for veterinarians. It may be possible
to argue the existence of a security interest perfected by possession
or an equitable lien, or that veterinary services are part of an
agister's lien. There are, however, several states with statutory liens
2" In the unlikely situation where the stallion owner has retained possession of the mare,
arguably, the common law lien could still by asserted in the non-live foal situation.
2" The mating certificate is an authenticity document required by the various private
associations such as the Jockey Club and the United States Trotting Association in order to
register the progeny. The various registration documents involved in the horse industry are
discussed more fully supra notes 129-63 and accompanying text.
23 There is some authority for extending the common law farrier lien to veterinarians.
See Lord v. Jones, 24 Me. 439 (1844).
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providing for a lien for veterinary services.2  These state Hens can
be characterized as either possessory or nonpossessory, although
possession may be a key component in either,
An enlightened approach for dealing with veterinarian's Hens
is typified by lien statutes such as that enacted in Florida:
LIENS FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES OF VETERINARI-
ANS. In favor of any veterinarian who renders professional serv-
ices to an animal at the request of the owner of the animal, the
owner's agent, or a bailee, lessee, or custodian of the animal, for
the unpaid portion of the fees for such professional services,
upon the animal to which such services were rendered. Such lien
shall remain valid and enforceable for a period of 1 year from
the date the professional services were rendered, and such lien is
to be enforced in the manner provided for the enforcement of
other liens on personal property in this state.2"1
The enforcement provisions of the Florida personal property
lien provide for self help in the form of retention of possession
for up to three months and an action at law or in chancery. The
statute also provides for the payment of attorney's fees and costs
in an amount up to fifteen percent of the judgment.2 4 Certainly
this is a more favorable statute to veterinarians, recognizing both
the practicalities of the service provided and the strong policy
argument that preserving the equine collateral is in everyone's
interest.
As previously mentioned, possession is still a factor to be
considered even in states providing for nonpossessory liens, such
as in Florida. U.C.C. section 9-310 provides that statutory liens
such as those provided by the Florida statute shall take priority
over an otherwise prior and perfected security interest if possession
is retained.23 5 Two major problems are inherent in possessory liens
32 The following states have enacted specific veterinary lien statutes: Alabama, ALA.
CODE § 35-11-390; California, CAL. Civ. CODE § 3051; Florida, FIA. STAT. § 713.655; Georgia,
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-490; Iowa, IowA CODE § 581.1; Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-836;
Louisiana, LA. Ray, STAT. ANN. § 9:4661 (applies only to racehorses); Maryland, MD. COM.
LAw CODE ANN. § 16-401; Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514.92; Nebraska, NEB. Ray.
STAT. § 52-701; New York, N.Y. LmN LAW § 183; South Dakota, S.D. Comp, LAWS ANN. §
40-27-12 (applicable only for providing vaccinations); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-12-
134; Virginia, VA. CODE § 3.1-796; Washington, WASH, Ray. CODE ANN. § 60.56,010. Other
states arguably provide lesser degrees of protection by the application of agister or mechanic
lien statutes.
'- 1988 Fla. Laws 713,655,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 85,011-85.051 (West 1987).
235 See complete discussion of U,C.C. § 9-310 at supra notes 42-56 and accompanying
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from the perspective of the veterinarian. First, it assumes that the
veterinarian will come into possession of the animal, which with
an animal as large as a horse will not always be the norm. Second,
in order for the lien to have continuing validity, possession often
must be retained.
G. Insurers
Equine mortality or fertility insurance is a common tool em-
ployed in the industry and is often made an express requirement
in a security agreement with a horse serving as collateral. A ques-
tion arises as to whether the insurer acquires an interest in any
insurance proceeds. This could arise in the situation where there
has been a default in the payment of the insurance premium. The
insurance contract may or may not provide for a right of setoff
for unpaid premium in the event of a loss under the policy.
In Kentucky there is a well-established principle that an insurer
has a duty to apply funds due the insured to the payment of
premium in order to avoid a forfeiture of the policy.2 6 While this
is more than just a right of setoff, it is not clear whether this duty
can be characterized as a lien. This line of cases typically involves
a dividend upon the policy that the insurer is required to apply to
an unpaid premium.2 37 The only requirement is that the funds be
under the control or in the possession of the insurer.238 Where the
same policy ensures more than one horse, this principle may have
some applicability. Also, there is the common law right of set
off.
2 3 9
H. Trucking Companies
Trucking companies may have a lien upon the horse for the
cost of transportation services depending upon whether the trucking
company can be characterized as a common carrier or a private
carrier. The general rule is that a common carrier has a lien upon
2m See, e.g., Cheek v. Commonwealth Life Ins., 126 S.W.2d 1084 (Ky. 1939) (law does
not favor forfeitures and where insurance company was indebted to insured it should have
applied those funds to pay the premium).
2n Id. at 1090.
Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Tye, 157 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1941) (cash surrender value was
not under insurer's control, therefore insurer had no duty to apply its insured premium
payment).
21 See 20 AM. Jtu. 2D: Counterclaim, Recoupment and Setoff § 2 (1965 and Supp.
1989).
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goods in its possession for unpaid freight charges, 240 while a private
carrier does not have the protection of a lien unless it has been
granted by special contractual provision. 241 The distinction between
the two types of carriers is determined by whether the carrier holds
itself out as a common carrier, accepting goods from all persons
indifferently subject to a tariff schedule that is federally regu-
lated.242
As with other types of bailment related liens, the priority status
of this particular lien is possession dependent. It is subject to the
priority enhancement features of U.C.C. section 9-310, but in many
respects ignores the practicalities and trade practice of the shipping
industry with respect to horses. If a company bills the owner after
delivery, the priority is lost.
I. Sales Companies
As heretofore noted, a sales company has a special status under
the Kentucky codification of the U.C.C. If the horse is a race
horse sold at public auction, the organization conducting such sale
will not be liable to the holder of a lien of a security interest unless
the holder of the lien has given notice directly to the sales company
by certified mail.243 Further, the sales company in Kentucky has
the additional protection of K.R.S. section 355.9-319, which re-
quires the secured party to first reduce his or her claim against the
debtor to a judgment before proceeding against either a purchaser
or a selling agent.
The sales company will normally charge a commission on the
sales price of the horse that may rise to a security interest on its
part chargeable against the horse or the proceeds from the dispo-
sition of the horse. There are two possible scenarios in which the
interest of the sales company could arise. First, the buyer may
default upon payment for the horse after taking possession. Sec-
ond, the proceeds from the sale may be subject to prior security
m See, e.g., Luther Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Roberts, 526 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (moving company was entitled to possessory lien on goods for payment of moving
charges).
24 See Campbell v. A.B.C. Storage, 174 S.W. 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915) (when goods
were moved by a private carrier and there was no special contract to prove a lien, a lien was
not present).
242 See United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S. 409 (1956) (even though
contract carrier actively solicited business, it was not representing itself to the public as a
common carrier).
3 K.R.S. § 355.9-307(6).
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interests that total more than the sale price. The sales company
will normally set out its right to payment from the proceeds in the
contract with the consignor. Its priority to these funds as against
prior perfected interests can be reached through a waiver theory.
The fact that the prior creditor has allowed the sale is a consent
to the payment of the commission. Arguably, the sales company
would have an equitable lien or a right of set off upon the funds
in its possession subject to the application of U.C.C. section 9-
310.
The second scenario is more difficult from the sales company's
perspective. Once it relinquishes possession, any security interest it
has in the horse will be subject to the same requisites as the typical
secured creditor, i.e., the sales company must have a security
agreement that has been properly perfected. A prudent sales com-
pany may arguably enhance its position by the retention of the
registration certificate pending payment in the same manner a
stallion owner retains a mating certificate.
J. Agents
An agent of either the buyer or the seller will be in the same
position as the sales company although the statutory protections
contained in U.C.C. section 9-307 may not apply where the agent
has acted in a private sale. The contract between agent and prin-
cipal will delineate the rights of the parties. Any interest that the
agent claims in the horse will be subject to the normal Article 9
requirements as there is no statutory or common law lien for
agents.
K. Judgment Lienholders
Article 9 of the U.C.C. is made expressly inapplicable to a lien
that arises as a result of a judgment unless that judgment was a
result of a right to payment that was collateral in nature. 244 Thus,
a general creditor can secure a judgment against a debtor and, in
the normal process of levying upon that judgment, obtain a lien
upon the debtor's property, which may include equine assets. 241
The problem is defining the relative rights of the judgment creditor
U.C.C. § 9-104(8).
245 See, e.g., K.R.S. § 426.10 provides for the execution against property upon the
rendering of a final judgment. The execution may not be rendered until ten days from the
rendition thereof without special order of the court. Id. at § 426.030.
1989-90]
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
as against other lienholders or secured parties with specific rights
in the property against which the judgment creditor is seeking to
levy. For purposes of priority, a judgment lienholder will prevail
over an unperfected security interest,2 although his or her interest
will be subordinate to any security interest that was perfected prior
to the attachment of the judicial lien.2 7 In effect, judgment cred-
itors have their liens perfected by the issuance of an execution.
CONCLUSION
In a decision key to the racing industry in Kentucky,28 the
court of appeals held that wagering on horses was a game of both
skill and chance, thus keeping it outside constitutional prohibitions
against games of pure chance. In many ways that analysis seems
appropriate here, as the myriad pattern of conflicting lien interests
makes the priority race somewhat a mixed game of skill and
chance. There is not always a ready answer or a clear-cut solution.
Certain key concepts seem to play an integral role in each analysis.
An understanding of these concepts, prior planning, and continued
vigilance are the keys to winning the priority race.
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
11 E.g., William Isolin & Co., Inc. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd., 276 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1967)
(factor's lien took priority over judgment creditors).
20 Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d 987 (Ky. 1931).
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